Saturday, March 12, 2011

(Delayed) Justice for Kidnappings in Argentina and Spain

In other legal news, after many years, Jorge Videla and Reynaldo Bignone (already in prison for life) and six other officials in the Argentine military junta have come to trial for the kidnapping of hundreds of babies from people who were persecuted – jailed, tortured, murdered – by the regime during Argentina’s “Dirty War.”
While the children were adopted by families friendly to the military leadership, their parents were rarely heard from again.

Female political prisoners were kept alive during their pregnancies, only to be summarily killed after giving birth, often dropped alive and naked into the sea from military aircraft.
The trial will involve hundreds of witnesses and last several months.

In Spain, meanwhile, the pressure continues to build for a full national investigation of the baby-stealing ring that began after the Civil War, when children of opponents of the dictatorship were kidnapped and adopted. (This was the subject of the book/film The Lost Children of Franco several years ago.)
Military psychologist Antonio Vallejo-Nagera built the ideological framework for the practice of taking children from their parents. He saw Marxism as a form of mental illness that was polluting the Hispanic race and advocated that children of leftists be removed and re-educated, a process he termed "separating the wheat from the chaff."

An unknown number of infants were taken from women's prisons. In addition, some Republican child evacuees were repatriated without their parents' consent and interned in Social Aid homes for schooling in religious and nationalist ideology. Many were adopted by right-wing families.
In the Spanish case, the involvement of priests and nuns seems clear; I don’t know if this was also the case in Argentina, though there is of course evidence of Church complicity more generally.*

Speaking of justice and the recovery of historical memory, I’m looking forward to seeing Patricio Guzmán’s new film, Nostalgia for the Light:



It’s showing in New York for the next couple of weeks, and he’s making appearances there. (He’s made some pro-Church films in the past, but the ones I’ve seen haven’t been. Hope this one isn’t all goddy.) ...By the way, why are these documentaries so expensive? Why don’t they put them on iTunes and elsewhere online and go for quantity? That way they could get their message out to more people far more quickly….

*Note - of Christian von Wernich:
On 9 October 2007 the court found him guilty of complicity in seven homicides, 42 kidnappings, and 32 instances of torture, and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

As of 1 February 2010 von Wernich has not been penalised by the Catholic Church and is permitted to officiate as priest at Mass in prison. On his conviction his superior, bishop Martín Elizalde, apologised for von Wernich being "so far from the requirements of the mission commended to him" and said "at the appropriate time von Wernich's situation will have to be resolved in accordance with canonical law", but never again referred to the issue in public.
Well, knock me over with a rusty thurible. I’m shocked.

Fighting Catch Shares

This is one of those weeks when I suspect I’ll anger a diverse set of people.



So. On to it!

It appears oral arguments in the suit challenging Amendment 16 begin on Tuesday in US District Court in Boston. For some background, see here, here, and here. For a highly critical perspective on catch shares and related regulatory schemes, see here (if you want the NOAA/NMFS/BINGO/Pew spin, you can find that pretty much anywhere).

Monday, February 28, 2011

Poem: Debt

Another found poem. Some might generally recognize the source.

Debt

Due to your failure
to avoid
further failure,

our client has
authorized us
to liquidate.

You are
hereby
null and void.

***

Poem: Pristine Bay

I was reading about "Honduras is Open for Business" recently.

In the days after the coup, searching for information, I came across this sickening piece. I planned to post about it then, but didn't. And now, an update. So I've composed another found poem (and another poem about Honduras) from these two "news" items.

Pristine Bay

Trade winds, unfettered views.
A foreign country,
shimmering, exotic,
jewel of the Caribbean.
Open to enjoy,
ringed by a narrow bunker.

A "soft opening,”
the bulldozers come in slowly.
Their designs, their culture.
Down there shooting,
digging up other people's property.
We're gonna move you out.

Tropical weather,
rioting in the streets,
pesticides ruining the reef,
guys threw the president out in his pajamas.
I hate to be crass, but
the crisis is not happening on the golf course.

We've seen some coups!
Down there in the Dominican Republic,
we were just starting.
Made a fortune,
worked all around the world.
They'll take a little less for a lot now.

Monday, February 14, 2011

Love and Skating

So I'm writing a post and it (shockingly) involves a sports movie with Robby Benson, which made me think of this favorite:



Another unforgettable skating moment was Oksana Baiul's. Play this music with this video on mute for the real thing:

Sunday, February 13, 2011

Delusions of Gender, Cordelia Fine

Researching popular claims about the differences between male and female brains is not an activity that is particularly good for the blood pressure. The sheer audacity of the overinterpretations and misinformation is startling. Some commentators declare themselves to be courageous taboo-breakers, who shout the scientific truth about sex differences into the hushed silence demanded by political correctness. But this is exactly how they shouldn’t be regarded. For one thing, neurosexism is so popular, so mainstream, that I think it is difficult to argue that our attitude toward the supposedly unmentionable idea of innate sex differences is usually anything other than casual and forgiving. Can you imagine schools implementing brain-based single-race classrooms after seeing a few slides and pseudo-scientific facts about differences between “black” brains and “white” brains? If to talk about innate psychological differences between males and females was truly shocking and provocative, would publishers wave onto their hot list, or editors into their columns, books and articles that so misinform and mislead?

But also, to those interested in gender equality there is nothing at all frightening about good science. It is only carelessly done science, or poorly interpreted science, or the neurosexism it feeds, that creates cause for concern. Unfortunately, pointing out the problems can easily be framed as desperate nitpicking or the shooting of the messenger. Yet as Kaplan and Rogers point out, ‘[s]kepticism and rigorous science are not bad faults compared to moving prematurely to conclusions, especially when they influence social attitudes’. These social attitudes about gender are an important part of the culture in which our brains and minds develop. (237)
This is from the conclusion of Cordelia Fine’s Delusions of Gender: How Our Minds, Society, and Neurosexism Create Difference (2010).

Recommended. The writing is crisp, clear, and often funny. Though the book offers many insights, the most interesting section for me at the moment was Part 2, “Neurosexism,” in which Fine discusses several of the studies that have been raised in these discussions recently.* She examines (and rips apart) individual studies and interpretations, but goes beyond this to place these in historical and scientific context. I have a sincere hope that the people who have been pointing to these studies will take the time to read at least this part of Fine’s book. In any case, in the future rather than continue to repeat portions of the arguments and link to individual articles, I will simply refer people to this comprehensive treatment.

*I’m happy to say the vervet and rhesus “toy-preference” studies are included, and discussed at some length, and that she notes – though perhaps does not mock sufficiently – the inclusion of a certain object in the former.

Tuesday, February 8, 2011

Greg Grandin on the betrayal of democracy in Honduras

Greg Grandin has a nice piece in The Nation this week: "Democracy There, Democracy Here: Honduras." In it, he discusses events in Egypt and Honduras in terms of the broader theme of "Washington's betrayal of democracy" throughout the world. It offers a solid historical summary and updated information on what's happening on the ground in Honduras.

I found it through Adrienne Pine's blog Quotha, which Grandin recommends in his article as a wonderful source of news and analysis about Honduras and US imperialism. I concur!

Laughable gender research: the vervet toy-preference study

Here’s my critique of one of the worst pieces of “research” ever to be trumpeted by magazines, newspapers, or blogs:

Gerianne M. Alexander and Melissa Hines, “Sex differences in response to children’s toys in nonhuman primates (Cercopithecus aethiops sabaeus).” Evolution and Human Behavior 23 (2002) 467–479.

(The full text is available free online.) I can’t believe I’ve been in another discussion with someone who can’t see what’s wrong with this study. It’s the classic example (though there are others) of the deeply flawed research that people searching for evidence to support their pre-existing notions about innate sex differences accept uncritically, to the point that they meet my substantive criticisms with claims that I’m so ideologically blinded I can’t appreciate its value. (It is heartening that some others – and I hate to link to that blog, but just search for the word “vervet” – have been able to see through it.) People want to argue that it’s merely preliminary, providing some evidence suggesting the need for more refined studies (and we now see hilarious reviews of the research like this one). No, it isn’t. It doesn’t provide evidence of anything beyond perhaps some qualities of the researchers. I’m going to offer my extended critique of the article, and I’ll allow comments as long as they demonstrate a reading and thinking about what I’ve said and aren’t utterly stupid.

Here’s the abstract:
Sex differences in children’s toy preferences are thought by many to arise from gender socialization. However, evidence from patients with endocrine disorders suggests that biological factors during early development (e.g., levels of androgens) are influential. In this study, we found that vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops sabaeus) show sex differences in toy preferences similar to those documented previously in children. The percent of contact time with toys typically preferred by boys (a car and a ball) was greater in male vervets (n = 33) than in female vervets (n = 30) (P < .05), whereas the percent of contact time with toys typically preferred by girls (a doll and a pot) was greater in female vervets than in male vervets (P < .01). In contrast, contact time with toys preferred equally by boys and girls (a picture book and a stuffed dog) was comparable in male and female vervets. The results suggest that sexually differentiated object preferences arose early in human evolution, prior to the emergence of a distinct hominid lineage. This implies that sexually dimorphic preferences for features (e.g., color, shape, movement) may have evolved from differential selection pressures based on the different behavioral roles of males and females, and that evolved object feature preferences may contribute to present day sexually dimorphic toy preferences in children.
People seem to want to suggest that the authors are simply fishing for any sex differences in object preferences. But it is obvious that they are not. They are hypothesizing that the bases for alleged human sex differences in toy preference are evolved from a time before our hominid lineage began, and they believe their results show this.

Of course, you could do research giving vervets a series of random objects, not controlling for shape, color, texture, size, and so on and with no real expectation that sex or other differences would appear. If you did, you wouldn’t know why any apparent results emerged, and these would likely be a statistical blip that wouldn’t be replicated. This is what these researchers are in fact doing, but it isn’t at all what they think they’re doing. Let’s take a look at the rationale for selecting these objects:
Boys favor construction and transportation toys, whereas girls favor toys such as dolls (Connor & Serbin, 1977; Liss, 1981). Boys are also more active (Campbell & Eaton, 1999; Eaton & Enns, 1986) and show more rough physical play than girls (DiPietro, 1981).
This is automatically problematic, as it’s improper to select some studies from a single culture at a single moment in time and suggest they represent some transcultural and transhistorical preferences of “boys” and “girls." That aside, the authors note the literature suggesting nonbiological reasons for any observed differences in toy-preference and play styles:
These sexually dimorphic play styles are thought by many to derive from learning and cognitive mechanisms associated with gender socialization (see Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colburne, Sen, & Eichstedt, 2001 for a recent discussion). Learning theories suggest that sex differences in play activities and toy preferences arise from modeling and reinforcement of sex-typical play (Bandura, 1977; Fagot & Hagan, 1991; Langlois & Downs, 1990). Cognitive theories suggest further that children develop an understanding of their gender identity that results in schemas or mental representations of socially defined gender appropriate behavior and a positive evaluation of toys and activities associated with this gender identification (Maccoby, 1988; Martin, 1999; Martin, Wood, & Little, 1990).
These authors, though, hypothesize that human sex differences in toy preferences reflect evolved differences. They believe they can test this hypothesis (to use the term loosely) by studying another primate species:
The present research addressed the hypothesis that toy preferences may be associated with factors other than human social and cognitive development by measuring toy preferences in a nonhuman primate, the vervet monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops sabaeus). Unlike humans, vervet monkeys are not subject to the specific social and cognitive influences proposed to explain human sex differences in toy preferences. To evaluate the possibility that sex differences in toy preferences can arise independent of these social and cognitive mechanisms, we therefore tested the hypothesis that vervet monkeys, like human beings, show sex differences in toy preferences.
In other words, they expect that vervets will exhibit the same differences in preference that humans allegedly do, for the reason that the bases for these differences evolved in some ancestor, millions of years ago, common to both vervets and humans (and indeed, all primates). It is misleading to call these objects in this study “toys” – they are not measuring play behavior, but merely contact with the objects. Furthermore, it isn’t, as the authors acknowledge later, a study of preferences: the objects are presented to the monkeys sequentially, one at a time.

But a study of sex differences in object preference for a given species should be designed with that species’ lifestyle – behaviors, including sex differences in activities; social structure - in mind. Vervets are little monkeys that, like most primates, are largely herbivorous, but for occasional insects, grubs, and small rodents. They’re known for emitting a high-pitched squeal on the approach of a predator. The authors of this paper suggest in the discussion that females are more responsible for child care. With this in mind, let’s consider the objects selected for the study:
For each trial, six toys were placed in the group cage, one at a time, in a random order. Each toy remained in the enclosure for 5 min. The six toys were a ball, a police car, a soft doll, a cooking pot, a picture book and a stuffed dog. These toys were categorized as ‘‘masculine’’ toys, ‘‘feminine’’ toys, or ‘‘neutral’’ toys on the basis of evidence that boys are more interested than girls in balls and cars (the ‘‘masculine’’ toy set), girls are more interested than boys in dolls and pots (the ‘‘feminine’’ toy set), and boys and girls are approximately equally interested in books and stuffed animals (the ‘‘neutral’’ toy set) (Berenbaum & Hines, 1992; Connor & Serbin, 1977; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). The six toys were selected because children in a broad age range categorize them as ‘‘masculine,’’ ‘‘feminine,’’ or ‘‘neutral’’ and, for those toys categorized as ‘‘masculine’’ or ‘‘feminine,’’ the sex difference in toy preferences is reliable and relatively large in children.
The objects were not randomly selected. They were chosen because of claimed sex differences in human children’s toy preferences. (Again, although it is sadly common, it is improper to generalize from a single culture in one moment to “boys” and “girls.” But that’s not where this research goes hilariously wrong.) Again, the suggestion is that sex differences in preferences for features of these toys evolved early in primates. They are selected as objects, not for color or size or other aspects – a ball or cooking pot could be any color, and none of these aspects is controlled for.

So, the “masculine” "toys" are a police car and a ball. Remember that they’re suggesting that a male preference for these objects evolved early in primates. A plausible argument, if innate male preference for these objects were found in humans, would be that males, because of their role in hunting, evolved an interest in objects that move, can be thrown, etc. But why would we expect male vervets to prefer such objects? Neither male nor female vervets hunt, and the authors haven’t presented any evidence of sex differences from vervet lives or behaviors, or those of their ancestors, to suggest any reason for vervet males to have evolved a relative preference for "active" objects. But in any case the authors aren’t measuring the style of play, just contact,* and there’s no way the monkeys could know prior to making contact with the objects whether or not they’re mobile. (Leaving aside that a doll or cooking pot can be a mobile toy for active play, as can really all of those included. It’s a long stretch to suggest that they somehow sense that these objects specifically would come to be associated with humans’ “rough and tumble play.”)

Of the gendered objects selected, the only one that could reasonably, based on knowledge of vervets, be expected to possibly elicit a preference from one sex would be the doll. As the authors mention in their conclusion, vervet females have primary responsibility for the young, and it’s plausible to suggest an evolved sex difference in preference for objects that resemble infants – that are “animate.” (Again, they aren’t measuring actual “play” behaviors, but merely contact.) It’s a stretch, though. There isn’t really any reason to think that vervets would see a human doll, or even a vervet doll, as animate. It reflects the authors lack of attention to the species being studied that they selected a human doll in the first place.

The inclusion of a cooking pan as a “feminine” “toy,” though, is what renders the study ridiculous. Recall that this was selected based on alleged girl preferences in late twentieth-century North America, and that the authors believe that if they observe a female preference among vervets for this object it is evidence that its foundations appeared early in our pre-hominid evolution. This is a feature of more than one bit of this sort of gender “research” that shows the extent to which the authors aren’t thinking through their premises. The only plausible argument for the alleged preference for playing with cooking pots among human girls is that they have evolved to be more nurturing or domestic or something, and these are part of their symbolic play reflecting those tendencies. It’s bizarre to include cooking in this particular sphere given that it’s far from universally associated with females (even in our own culture). But it would be completely bizarre to argue that human females evolved a preference for modern objects currently associated with cooking as objects such that they would be drawn to their form without any knowledge of their function. To suggest that female vervets or our common ancestors, who obviously lack any knowledge of cooking, evolved a preference for these as objects is simply ludicrous. Species don’t evolve in anticipation of another species millions of years later using objects in a certain way.

The neutral objects (the stuffed dog and the picture book), like the others, are random. The stuffed dog, though, unintentionally on their part, provides a sort of “control” in their terms.

Given this silly design, whatever “data” they turn up are not going to support their broader hypothesis about shared primate evolution or the evolutionary basis of alleged human sex differences. So what did they find? Generally,
The proportion of contact time with toys typically preferred by boys was greater in male vervets compared to female vervets, whereas the proportion of contact time with toys typically preferred by girls was greater in female vervets compared to male vervets. In contrast, contact time with toys preferred equally by boys and girls was comparable in male and female monkeys. These sex differences in vervets resemble the well-documented sex differences in children’s toy preferences.
However,
Although the serial introduction of the toys does not permit a true contrast of the relative preference for ‘‘masculine’’ over ‘‘feminine’’ toys within each sex, a within-sex comparison of contact scores showed that female vervets had greater percent contact with ‘‘feminine’’ over ‘‘masculine toys,’’ P < .01, but males had similar percent contact with ‘‘masculine’’ and ‘‘feminine’’ toys, P= .19.
In contrast to these sex differences in contact with ‘‘masculine’’ or ‘‘feminine’’ toys, no sex differences in percent contact with toys in the ‘‘neutral’’ category were found, t(61) ="0.61, P=.54.
The data are presented in rather misleading ways. For example, several of the findings – as that males did not make contact with the “masculine” toys any more than they did with the “feminine” ones - are presented cursorily such that they’re easily missed, and this is abetted by the way the graphs are presented. Also, although they’re not measuring actual play, they imply that the vervets separately were engaging with these objects in ways consistent with human play, suggesting: “In some instances, we also noted that vervet monkeys [note the lack of a sex qualifier] contacted toys in ways that appeared to resemble children’s contact with them.” Figure 2 shows two pictures, with the caption:
Examples of a female and a male animal contacting toys. The female animal (left) appears to be conducting an anogenital inspection of the toy doll, similar to inspections of infant vervet monkeys. The male animal (right) appears to be moving the car along the ground in a manner similar to that a child might use.
Moving a car along the ground is pretty much to be expected for anyone touching it, and the grasping “anogenital inspection” strains credulity. Of course, the rationale for selecting this set of objects in a vervet study and expecting sex differences is so silly – it would only have been funnier if they had shown a picture of a female “appearing to be” stirring something in the pot – that these interpretations are meaningless, but it's worthwhile to note that the paper as a whole (not to mention Alexander's statements in subsequent interviews) presents the data in a rather skewed way.

The improper way they go about interpreting their data likely reflects both their biases and that they must have realized too late how ridiculous their research design was. They conclude:
In view of this evidence, our findings suggest that object features or functions associated with human sex-typed toy categories may have adaptive significance for males and females.

Although nonhuman primates can learn to categorize novel stimuli (Freedman, Riesenhuber, Poggio, & Miller, 2001), the monkeys we observed had no learning history with the individual toys used in this study. Additionally, there is no evidence that vervets have an understanding of their gender. Yet, even if they do have a gender identity, they would not have had the experiences with objects (e.g., police car, cooking pot, book) that might be necessary to form categories based on associations between toys and gender in humans. Sex differences in toy preferences in a species lacking relevant social and cognitive experiences suggest, therefore, that other determinants of sex-typed object categorization exist.
It’s nothing short of amazing that they would suggest that the fact that vervets have no knowledge or understanding of these toys and showed some differences suggests innateness of alleged human preferences. This fact is what makes their design so crazily bad. They go on to argue that
Children’s toys, therefore, appear to have differential value for males and females of at least two primate species, vervets and humans. This new finding provides additional support for the hypothesis that sex differences in toy preferences can arise independent of the social and cognitive mechanisms thought by many to be the primary influences on toy preferences in human beings.
But as I’ve discussed, sex differences in these object “preferences” in vervets, should they appear, are likely to be a fluke, an artifact of a single study. They acknowledge: “Information is not yet adequate to know what low-level perceptual properties may contribute to the responses to sex-typed toys by vervet monkeys and this study was not designed to evaluate these hypothetical feature preferences.” But this is a tremendous understatement. The idea that female vervets would have evolved a preference for cooking pots is absurd on its face. In the conclusion they pull novel “explanations” out of the air.

Again, the doll was probably the only of the gendered objects for which a plausible rationale exists for thinking it might elicit sex differences. They appeared to find them in that females made more contact with it than males. So they launch into a discussion of female nurturing (all of a sudden talking about vervet behaviors!):
[T]oys preferred by girls have been described as objects that afford opportunities for nurturance (Campbell, Shirley, & Heywood, 2000; Eisenberg, Murray, & Hite, 1982; Miller, 1987), and selection pressures may favor responsiveness to object cues (e.g., an animate-like form) that signal maternal behavior because these cues enhance infant survival. A doll, for example, may be of greater interest to females than males in primate species where females interact with infants more than males do. Such species include humans (Blakemore, 1981) and vervet monkeys (Lancaster, 1971; Meaney, Lozos, & Stewart, 1990).
As I said, it’s questionable whether vervets would recognize a human doll as “animate-like.” Interestingly, one of the “neutral” objects was also considered by the authors to be “animate-like.” And they note:
However, as we found no sex differences in response to toy categories based on an animate-like (doll, dog) or inanimate-like (car, ball, book, pan) distinction, it appears that other characteristics contributed to the female object preferences we observed.
Indeed, the males touched the “animate-like” furry dog more than both of the “masculine” objects. So the alleged nurturing-based attraction to “animate-like” objects among females appears to be thrown in there to promote readings that aren’t, in their terms, based on the data. (As with the doll, I’m not convinced the furry dog was "animate" to vervets, though it's also possible that it was and the doll was not.)

And of course this ignores the pan. So they switch to speculation about color which they can’t support with their data. (I wonder if it wasn’t until they were writing this up that they realized how profoundly dumb had been the inclusion of the cooking pot…) They try to get around this by selectively suggesting – in a way not at all in keeping with the study’s rationale or design – that the female “preference” for the "feminine" objects might have been related to their color:
Color may also provide an important cue for female interest…A preference for red or reddish pink has been proposed to elicit female behaviors to infants that enhance infant survival, such as contact (Higley, Hopkins, Hirsch, Marra, & Suomi, 1987). The hypothesis that reddish pink or red may be a cue signaling opportunities for nurturance and thus eliciting female responsiveness could explain our finding of greater female contact with both the doll (with a pink face) and the pot (colored red).
So this “hypothesis” could provide a post hoc “explanation.” Leaving aside the fact that the “masculine” ball was orange, it should be noted that the pot was also hard and metallic, and potentially noisy, but the authors don’t suggest that any of these features – inconsistent with human gender stereotypes – could have been the basis for this preference. Of course, without controlling for other aspects of the objects, any of these speculations are basically worthless.

In any event, any preference for reddish objects, should it exist, is not the same as a preference for “feminine toys,” which is the whole basis for the study and its conclusions. Recall: This is a study of object preferences, and the cooking pot was selected because human “girls are more interested than boys in…pots.” They are arguing that "object features or functions associated with human sex-typed toy categories" shape the preferences of vervets, indicating something about human evolution. But while hardness and metallicness are inherent features of modern cooking pots, redness is not – a cooking pot could be any color at all. The random suggestion that “Well, females may have been drawn to this cooking pot because it was red" is totally inconsistent with the whole rationale of the study. They're suggesting that females would prefer red objects regardless of their sex-typing. (No doubt this would have been their post hoc "reasoning" had, for example, the car been red and this been the case. There is no finding too inconsistent with gender stereotypes that those who want to cannot find a way to interpret in terms of gender stereotypes.)

On to the males. More speculation:
Toys preferred by boys, such as the ball and police car used in this research, have been characterized as objects with an ability to be used actively (O’Brien & Huston, 1985) or objects that can be propelled in space (Benenson, Liroff, Pascal, & Cioppa, 1997). Preferences for such objects may exist because they afford greater opportunities for engaging in rough or active play. In humans, these characteristics have in turn been suggested to relate to targeting or navigating abilities (for discussion, see Alexander, in press) that might be particularly useful for males for purposes of hunting or locating food or mates (Eals & Silverman, 1994; McBurney, Gaulin, Devineni, & Adams, 1997; Silverman & Eals, 1992). As suggested for females in regard to objects that signal nurturance, males may therefore have evolved preferences for objects that invite movement.
The various problems with this have been discussed above: vervets do not hunt, they’ve proposed nothing about vervets that would make anyone expect males to be relatively drawn to objects that "invite movement," and they aren’t studying what the vervets actually did with the objects (again, all of the objects they selected have an ability to be "used actively” or “propelled in space,” and there’s no logical reason to think that vervets would perceive these particular ones as “active”). But the fact is that the males didn’t prefer (note the change from “prefer” to “appear to prefer”) the “masculine” toys to the “feminine” toys. "[A]lthough female vervets preferred ‘feminine’ toys over ‘masculine’ toys,” they concede,
male vervets did not appear to prefer ‘‘masculine’’ toys over ‘‘feminine’’ toys. This difference between male vervets and boys may indicate that toy preferences in boys are directed by gender socialization to a larger degree than are toy preferences in girls.
It doesn’t, because the study is ridiculous to begin with. It doesn’t show anything about the evolution of alleged sex differences in human toy preferences. None of this stops them from making proclamations like:
We...suggest that children’s toy preferences reflect innate object preferences that are elaborated in typical human development by subsequent gender socialization. We found differences between male and female vervet monkeys that resemble the well-established differences in the toy preferences of boys and girls, consistent with the proposed existence of innate object preferences.
It’s a joke, and no amount of "But look! The female vervets touched the eyeshadow significantly more than the Super Bowl tickets!" is going to salvage it.

* "Contact was coded when an animal (or animals) approached a toy and made physical contact with it. Approach was coded only when an animal moved within 2 m of a toy without contacting it physically..."

Sunday, January 2, 2011

Movie lines

Best movie quotes. Not a bad list.

“It was the Dukes!” deserves a mention.

My favorite recent line is from The City of Your Final Destination (not a great film). Laura Linney plays the artist (Caroline):
Deirdre: It’s not my field but...some paintings I like very much. I’ve been hoping to talk -

Caroline: What kind of paintings do you like very much?

Deirdre: The Impressionists. Cézanne, Monet, van Gogh. Perhaps they weren’t all Impressionists... Or were they?

Caroline: [sips drink] As far as you need be concerned, they were.
Beautiful delivery.

What on earth are hospitals for?

Ophelia Benson has been posting tenaciously about this.

I don’t come at it wishing to debate (though I’m glad others do) abstruse and absurd Catholic dogma. I can’t for the life of me understand how they could seriously be putting this forward as a policy in the US in this century.

The purpose of hospitals is to reduce the suffering and save the lives of patients. It would be insane to license or insure a healthcare facility with an intentional danger or death policy. No facility, surely, could adopt this terrible policy, right? Catholic and other hospitals will of course come forward to say that they don’t have and have never had a policy to willfully refuse to save women's lives, right?

RIGHT?

Saturday, January 1, 2011

It's 2011, and evidence for "god" is still not possible.

I was reluctant to return to this topic, but a recent post of PZ’s has raised it again, and some people have made comments that seem to express a sincere wish to engage with the position I’m advocating.*

Anri remarks:
And herein we have the problem of evidence for god again.

I'd like to ask, as an open question, anyone who is of the opinion that evidence for god is impossible:

If there is no state of the universe that could provide evidence for god, than how is the state of the universe relevant to the existence of god?

In other words, saying 'There is no state of the universe that could demonstrate god,' while also saying 'The observed universe does not demonstrate god, therefore do not believe' is incoherent. If the answer to Question A has no possible bearing on Postulate X, than answering Question A gives you no hint as to the truth of Postulate X, yes?

The argument that the state of the universe is a good reason not to believe in god must tacitly recognize that different states of the universe might provide more or less evidence for this concept.

Please let me know if I'm barking up the wrong tree here, and if so, howso?
I’m going to assume that Anri was referring to our arguments rather than other, different ones. If that assumption is correct, yes, (s)he’s barking up the wrong tree. The argument we’re making is prior to any consideration of evidence, and renders adducing evidence impossible.

A claimed entity has to be something. If someone is claiming that some concept X exists, there must be a concept X. Without an X, it makes no sense to talk about what would constitute evidence for the existence of X, or in fact to consider its possible existence at all. References to “god” or “this concept” assume an X, but no one has been able to produce the concept in any form for which evidence could conceivably be adduced.

So, again, the problem is prior to any evidence. The state of the universe doesn’t and can’t demonstrate anything with regard to gods, since no god-concept has been brought forth for which any empirical findings demonstrate anything. Of course, nothing that isn’t defined qualifies for belief. Existence and belief are simply meaningless with regard to these vague notions. (It’s difficult in English even to describe them: “vague” or “undefined entities” presumes an underlying concept, which doesn’t exist here.)

The problems multiply when people refer to alleged qualities or aspects of these nonconcepts (anticoncepts?). IanM suggests, in response to “A coherent, falsifiable definition would be a good start, as well,”
I find that an unreasonable condition. They are arguing for an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent God and yet the attributes with which they describe God leaves God immeasurable and undefined.
But here’s the same problem. “[A]n omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent X” assumes an X, which hasn’t been defined. Nor can attributes constitute a definition. We understand what “knowing,” for example, means in terms of physical entities and processes. And “knowledge” and “love” can be abstracted from these. But what does “knowing” mean divorced entirely from them? Nothing. Again, English makes it difficult to express the meaninglessness of these ideas, since even the most “immaterial” terms we have – “free-floating” and so on - still presuppose a basis in real things and processes. (Not to mention that “They don’t define it so requiring a definition is unreasonable” does not an argument make.)

Until such time as a god-concept can be defined, it’s a nonsense syllable.

(This is an important topic, and I wish to do my best to be understood in the discussion, so I hope this helps, but I’m not going to publish any unduly hostile comments.)

* The criticism of PZ along the lines of “Well, PZ would exclude himself based on that chart given that he doesn’t admit any evidence for God” is rather silly. First, the chart is about Christians, but PZ refers in his post title to creationists, who are making incorrect claims about defined and evidenced facts and theories. Second, the underlying problem with god arguments comes, as I discuss again here, prior to evidence. Since any debate concerning the existence of any god-concepts requires these to be defined, and they haven’t been, they can’t possibly be debate topics in the first place. As mikerattlesnake points out, “I would add a rule (#1) that all terms in the topic of debate are clearly defined before even considering a debate.”

Monday, December 27, 2010

Friday, December 24, 2010

Totally unexpected results from trap tree poll

Here's the poll at GoodMorningGloucester. Who could have foreseen this?

Words!

Jerry Coyne is asking about beautiful words. Here’s a list of 70 (or thereabouts - I hate counting). ...Of the moment. I’m mercurial.

anemone
aquifer
bacilli*
balm
bazaar
calamitous
caravan
conjurer
dancehall
deft
eucalyptus
faraway
froth
glazier
gravelly
gypsum
harbor
hooch
impostor
inkwell
intrigue
jowl
kiosk
languid
lemony
mahogany
mariner
mineral
mystic
nebula
oblivion
oyster
pamphleteer
parabola
perfunctorily
preposterous
quahog
quixotic
ramshackle
regret
revel
saffron
satellite
scallop
schooner
scurrilous
serene
snout
souk
sultry
swagger
swizzlestick**
taffy
tambourine
tawdry
thalassic
tisane
tonic
trinket
tropic
tryst
ubiquity
vagabond
vainglorious
vaudeville
vexatious
wanton
whelk
zinc

* The list of lovely biological terms is endless (Delphinidae? Mellifluous!).
** I declare this to be a single word.

Thursday, December 2, 2010

Social Science, the Right, and the AAA

The Right’s relationship with academics, and social scientists in particular, has two sides: trying to make use of them (the Human Terrain System, encouraging psychologists’ participation in torture, “security” centers, efforts to use scholarly credibility to burnish propaganda efforts, and corporate influence on the functioning of universities in general) and attacking them (seeking to withdraw funding to Middle Eastern Studies programs or social science funding by the NSF, generally rejecting social scientific research other than that viewed as useful). This week’s news has highlighted both prongs, neither of them good, of course, for the social sciences, and both of which continue to be resisted. Unfortunately, it’s also brought to light some confused social scientists who seem to be playing into this strategy while apparently believing they’re doing the opposite.

The attempts to utilize academic credibility for propaganda purposes have been revealed by Adrienne Pine in her work on FIU’s “Strategic Culture” Initiative, in which “anthropology's analysis and cultural capital are appropriated in order to facilitate and legitimize military violence.” As she argues:
The concept of "culture" is being used to justify the violent actions of the U.S. military throughout the hemisphere. Culture is also used to justify U.S. training of and funding for Latin American military forces that engage in torture, targeted assassinations of dissidents, and carry out coups d'etats. But the abuse of the culture concept in the service of empire is neither new, nor unique to the militarized university. In the case of Honduras, groups like the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) have promoted the idea that Honduras suffers from a culture of violence—rather than a neoliberal policy of state violence in which poverty is criminalized and the victims of structural violence are blamed. This difference is crucial; if violence is cultural, then "security"—in the form of increased U.S. military aid and training—is a logical solution for disciplining an unruly, uncivilized population. However, if violence is the explicit policy of a militarized client state protecting corporate profits from falling into the hands of the Honduran people, then democracy—however the Honduran people should choose to approach it—is the solution.
I’ve read quickly through the Bolivia report, and it’s astonishing. It would be hilarious if I didn’t fear its potential effectiveness. In this attack on the Bolivian Left, the entire history (and present) of exploitation, oppression, terror, greed, and destruction is purported to be – I said it was astonishing – essentially a set of notions concocted by an authoritarian “culture of victimization.” It’s pure propaganda. There is, in fact, no science here. The author, making several patently ridiculous suggestions, offers a handful of citations, of a quality people can judge for themselves. This isn’t scholarship.

The other side of the blade is the outright attack, represented most recently by the efforts of Eric Cantor. As PZ describes:
He wants people to search NSF and report back to him with grant numbers that they don't like.

...And then he gives hints on searching the database, listing words that might yield boondoggles: "success, culture, media, games, social norm, lawyers, museum, leisure, stimulus, etc."
What’s important to recognize is that this has nothing to do with spending or waste. These attacks are, in some cases, mere posturing, and in many based on a genuine fear of the production and dissemination of real scholarly work contrary to their interests.

In this ongoing context of active efforts by those on the Right to derail the social sciences by co-opting or eliminating them, I found the reports of the past few days concerning intended changes to the American Anthropological Association’s mission statement troubling. This appears to be an effort to distance anthropology from science. (I’m unimpressed by Hugh Gusterson’s suggestions (in the comments here) that the changes aren’t significant and that the process has been democratic because, well, “The Executive Board is elected by the membership to make these kinds of decisions” and the document was sent to the section heads.

Sadly, science has for many people come to be conflated with imperialism and oppression, state and corporate power. It’s one thing to say that anthropology as a discipline has been used for statist, imperialist, and corporate ends (and this includes not only the content of anthropological works but, as Foucault made clear long ago, the practice of anthropology itself). It’s quite another to suggest, as these changes would, that this is somehow inherent in science.

I’m most distressed that the terms central to the discussion are not being defined, leading to unintentional misrepresentations. Science is a means of building knowledge about the world through reasoned and systematic empirical investigation and analysis. It’s the only valid or reliable means we have to assess fact claims. I’d like to think – realizing this would be naïve – that anthropologists wouldn’t seriously reject this as a description of their discipline, but I fear I might be wrong. I was recently watching an interview with Derrick Jensen (not an anthropologist, it should be noted) on Democracy Now!*, which contained this exchange:
AMY GOODMAN: Derrick, what is the influence of Native Americans in your writing, in your work, in your activism?

DERRICK JENSEN: It’s another great question. And I have tried not to romanticize them, which is another form of objectification. And what I do know is I know that the Tolowa Indians, on whose land I now live up in way northern California, they lived there for at least 12,500 years, if you believe the myths of science. And if you believe the myths of the Tolowa, they lived there since the beginning of time, using a myth as stories that we tell ourselves that make the world fit together. So, in any case, the Tolowa lived there for at least 12,500 years....
No. Science is not simply a “story we tell ourselves to make the world fit together.” It’s a method of discovering reality. The Tolowa have been there for an amount of time, and that is a fact. If you want to say that whenever “they” arrived there was, for them, the beginning of time, OK, but you’re merely poeticizing that fact. And seriously, you’re first sentences offered empirical claims about environmental changes (which I haven’t confirmed) that are the products of science.

On the other side, what are the “ways of knowing” these anthropologists wish to place alongside science? Concretely, as a method – what are they? Personal revelation? The interpretation of ancient texts? As much as “science” needs to be defined in this discussion, so does “ancient wisdom.” Is this term being used to refer to sets of ideas or to the “method” of referring to elders or texts? I think that in contexts in which practices that have allowed people to live sustainably in the world for tens, hundreds, or thousands of years, ecological ideas or practices should be taken and investigated very seriously. There’s a great deal that’s unknown about ecosystems and our role in them, and practical knowledge that’s been developed in essence scientifically over generations is potentially highly valuable. That does not mean that we should accept any fact claims wearing the mantle of “ancient wisdom.”

Nor do I understand the line some people seem to want to draw between advocacy and science (in which I include history). The idea that advocacy is in essence un- or anti-scientific is simply wrong. Advocacy, to be effective and to be ethical, needs to be based on an accurate assessment of reality, and for this we need science. I understand (and frequently make) the argument that scientific practice is generally organized to serve corporations and governments; I understand that corporations and governments have effectively worked to claim “science” for themselves. But we need to distinguish between the current, transitory, situation and the meaning of science. We should criticize scientific work on its questions, methods, data, and analysis, and promote good science. It’s sad that those who are buying the “culture/activism = anti-science” line don’t seem to grasp that the conception of science on which this is based is fundamentally flawed, and that accepting it contributes – intentionally or not - to a right-wing political project.

I think – and I’m in the good company of Sokal, Chomsky, and Mills here – that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that science, as the means of establishing knowledge about reality (including social reality), is a tool of liberation, and ignorance and anti-science means of oppression. It’s a catastrophic error to allow others to define science in such a way that people are led to reject it, and it plays Right into the hands of the (corporate, political, religious) oppressors.

*(Which I otherwise found quite interesting, particularly his challenge to the “Gandhi shield,” though I have problems with some of his arguments.)