Saturday, January 1, 2011

It's 2011, and evidence for "god" is still not possible.

I was reluctant to return to this topic, but a recent post of PZ’s has raised it again, and some people have made comments that seem to express a sincere wish to engage with the position I’m advocating.*

Anri remarks:
And herein we have the problem of evidence for god again.

I'd like to ask, as an open question, anyone who is of the opinion that evidence for god is impossible:

If there is no state of the universe that could provide evidence for god, than how is the state of the universe relevant to the existence of god?

In other words, saying 'There is no state of the universe that could demonstrate god,' while also saying 'The observed universe does not demonstrate god, therefore do not believe' is incoherent. If the answer to Question A has no possible bearing on Postulate X, than answering Question A gives you no hint as to the truth of Postulate X, yes?

The argument that the state of the universe is a good reason not to believe in god must tacitly recognize that different states of the universe might provide more or less evidence for this concept.

Please let me know if I'm barking up the wrong tree here, and if so, howso?
I’m going to assume that Anri was referring to our arguments rather than other, different ones. If that assumption is correct, yes, (s)he’s barking up the wrong tree. The argument we’re making is prior to any consideration of evidence, and renders adducing evidence impossible.

A claimed entity has to be something. If someone is claiming that some concept X exists, there must be a concept X. Without an X, it makes no sense to talk about what would constitute evidence for the existence of X, or in fact to consider its possible existence at all. References to “god” or “this concept” assume an X, but no one has been able to produce the concept in any form for which evidence could conceivably be adduced.

So, again, the problem is prior to any evidence. The state of the universe doesn’t and can’t demonstrate anything with regard to gods, since no god-concept has been brought forth for which any empirical findings demonstrate anything. Of course, nothing that isn’t defined qualifies for belief. Existence and belief are simply meaningless with regard to these vague notions. (It’s difficult in English even to describe them: “vague” or “undefined entities” presumes an underlying concept, which doesn’t exist here.)

The problems multiply when people refer to alleged qualities or aspects of these nonconcepts (anticoncepts?). IanM suggests, in response to “A coherent, falsifiable definition would be a good start, as well,”
I find that an unreasonable condition. They are arguing for an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent God and yet the attributes with which they describe God leaves God immeasurable and undefined.
But here’s the same problem. “[A]n omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent X” assumes an X, which hasn’t been defined. Nor can attributes constitute a definition. We understand what “knowing,” for example, means in terms of physical entities and processes. And “knowledge” and “love” can be abstracted from these. But what does “knowing” mean divorced entirely from them? Nothing. Again, English makes it difficult to express the meaninglessness of these ideas, since even the most “immaterial” terms we have – “free-floating” and so on - still presuppose a basis in real things and processes. (Not to mention that “They don’t define it so requiring a definition is unreasonable” does not an argument make.)

Until such time as a god-concept can be defined, it’s a nonsense syllable.

(This is an important topic, and I wish to do my best to be understood in the discussion, so I hope this helps, but I’m not going to publish any unduly hostile comments.)

* The criticism of PZ along the lines of “Well, PZ would exclude himself based on that chart given that he doesn’t admit any evidence for God” is rather silly. First, the chart is about Christians, but PZ refers in his post title to creationists, who are making incorrect claims about defined and evidenced facts and theories. Second, the underlying problem with god arguments comes, as I discuss again here, prior to evidence. Since any debate concerning the existence of any god-concepts requires these to be defined, and they haven’t been, they can’t possibly be debate topics in the first place. As mikerattlesnake points out, “I would add a rule (#1) that all terms in the topic of debate are clearly defined before even considering a debate.”

9 comments:

  1. The conceptual impossibility of God and the call for evidence are surely two different questions. That is to say, the concept of God can be ill-conceived yet there still should be evidence of something. If there were something godlike intervening in the world we should know about it through evidential means. That we can't call it God (because those traits applied to God could never be satisfied) doesn't take away that the lack of evidence is good grounds for rejecting it.

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  2. The conceptual impossibility of God

    This is where language, I think, does us no favors. (Or perhaps the problem is that the term, imagined before science, has attained currency over the millennia without those using it being required to define it.) People can use this as though it’s a word with meaning, but it isn’t. "X exists" is the same claim. X or _ can be substituted with no loss of meaning.

    and the call for evidence are surely two different questions.

    They are in the sense that a call for evidence only makes sense in reference to defined concepts or entities. Evidence, and the discussion of what constitutes it, comes after.

    That is to say, the concept of God can be ill-conceived

    It has to be conceived. Otherwise it’s nothing.

    yet there still should be evidence of something.

    But what does this mean? X isn’t anything.

    If there were something godlike intervening in the world, we should know about it through evidential means.

    If “god” isn’t defined, “something godlike” isn’t either; nor is “intervening.”

    That we can't call it God (because those traits applied to God could never be satisfied)

    What “it”? What traits? What do you mean by “God”?

    doesn't take away that the lack of evidence is good grounds for rejecting it.

    There’s no sense in talking about the presence or lack of evidence for an unconcept.
    It’s not that there’s no evidence for the claim. It’s that there’s no effective claim. There’s nothing to consider. It's _.

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  3. "But what does this mean?"
    It means, we could conceive of evidence that we would attribute to intelligent agent(s) working in this world.

    "If “god” isn’t defined, “something godlike” isn’t either; nor is “intervening.”"
    But God as a conception means something.

    "There’s no sense in talking about the presence or lack of evidence for an unconcept."
    But there's a concept. The term God means something.

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  4. It means, we could conceive of evidence that we would attribute to intelligent agent(s) working in this world.

    Please define what you mean, and begin with "agent(s)."

    But God as a conception means something.

    What, precisely?

    But there's a concept. The term God means something.

    What's the concept? What does it mean? (Can you define it in terms of the questions I asked in my previous post?)

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  5. Agent - a person or thing that acts or has the power to act
    Intelligent - having good understanding or a high mental capacity

    The conception of God is just that. You can't call a pencil case God and proclaim that God exists because the pencil case does. That doesn't fit the conception of God. So from that, we know that God means something. It's not to say it's a well-formed concept, but it's a recognisable one. Much like the word "dragon", it's a concept that we can understand (again we can't call anything a dragon) yet it's something that might be conceptually-impossible. Even so, when I mention the word "dragon" you surely know what I'm talking about.

    I think the dragon example might illustrate what I'm trying to say. Fires would be evidence for dragons, and the lack of fires would be evidence against dragons. But fires can never prove that dragons exist because there's not a sufficient concept of a dragon to attribute fires to.

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  6. Agent - a person or thing that acts or has the power to act Intelligent - having good understanding or a high mental capacity The conception of God is just that.

    What do you mean by “person” or “thing” (a literal person or thing? If so, who/what?)? “Act”? "Understanding"? “Intelligent”? “Mental”? Do these latter concepts have any meaning outside physical entities?

    You can't call a pencil case God and proclaim that God exists because the pencil case does.

    ?

    That doesn't fit the conception of God.

    What conception? Whose conception? What specifically/precisely/exactly is this conception?

    So from that,

    From what?

    we know that God means something.

    What? (Seriously. Not a pencil case...therefore, what?)

    It's not to say it's a well-formed concept, but it's a recognisable one.

    No. It's nothing.

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  7. SC,

    I think, (as I've said before), that your emphasis on definition is simply wrong. Whatever definition is given, one can simply, as you did with Kel's, require that they define the terms used in that definition. Moreover, this applies to the definition of absolutely anything, including dogs, atoms, social classes, evolution... Natural language just doesn't work like that. Definitions can be useful, but they can never get you to "physical entities and processes".

    "“[A]n omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent X” assumes an X, which hasn’t been defined."

    No, it doesn't. "There exists an X, such that X is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent" is a meaningful proposition, which is either true or false.

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  8. I think, (as I've said before), that your emphasis on definition is simply wrong. Whatever definition is given, one can simply, as you did with Kel's, require that they define the terms used in that definition.

    Of course.

    Moreover, this applies to the definition of absolutely anything, including dogs, atoms, social classes, evolution...

    Right. And the terms used can be defined in those cases.

    Natural language just doesn't work like that. Definitions can be useful, but they can never get you to "physical entities and processes".

    Of course they can. Dogs and atoms and gravity are physical. Disagreements can and do of course exist concerning precise definitions and the specific nature of evidence for arguments concerning these entities and processes, but they remain physical. (Class is an abstraction from human conditions and relationships, but humans are physical. The equivalent in the case under consideration would be "defining" a deity as proletarian.)

    "“[A]n omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent X” assumes an X, which hasn’t been defined."

    No, it doesn't. "There exists an X, such that X is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent" is a meaningful proposition, which is either true or false.


    It isn't a meaningful proposition in terms of possibly adducing evidence for X. The adjectives themselves don't make sense without referents.

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  9. I was going to disagree, but on consideration I realise that omniscient isn't well-defined (does this god know the position and momentum and spin of every quantum particle? Then quantum entanglement wouldn't exist).

    Omnipotent is notoriously ill-defined (capable of everything, or of all logically possible thing, or of all physically possible things?).

    Omnibenevolent isn't really defined either (wishes everybody well? Everybody equally? wishes for maximal wellbeing on average? For humans? For humans and animals?)

    So yeah, the omnimax entity isn't defined and may even be a self-contradiction. Which also puts another nail in the coffin of the ontological argument, of course.

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